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forces will only win if they effectively employ ISR to enhance situational awareness and seize the initiative. Employing ISR effectively means ensuring seamless integration between ISR operations and maneuver operations, especially at the tactical level. One solution to meet Afghanistan's intelligence challenges involves embedding liaison officers at the tactical level to enable Army and Air Force tactical units to better understand each other's requirements and assist in destroying barriers that prevent operational integration. Improving integration of ISR operations between air and ground forces will enhance unity of effort and better enable the U.S. to meet its objectives in Afghanistan.
RECIPROCALLY EMBEDDING ISR LIAISONS TO BUILD UNITY OF EFFORT
In a speech to the Air War College, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates challenged students to develop innovative concepts to enable the U.S. to meet its strategic objectives in current contingency operations, even if the concepts do not fit the conventional wisdom of the Air Force. Secretary Gates stated, "…we can do-and we should do-more to meet the needs of men and women fighting in the current conflicts while their outcome may still be in doubt." Secretary Gates asked officers to pursue solutions, in the mold of the late Colonel John Boyd, which will enable airpower to meet "…complex challenges to our national security." 1 The most visible complex current challenge to U.S. national security, the war in Afghanistan, is driven primarily by Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Secretary Gates' mandate requires the services to continuously evaluate current operations in order to identify and implement necessary changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) to meet current challenges. 2 and as such, requires innovative thinking about ISR in order to create strategic advantage.
3 Coalition forces will only win this counterinsurgency if they effectively employ ISR in order to enhance situational awareness and seize the initiative. who continue to deconflict fires and provide terminal control to attack aircraft today. 6, 7 In Afghanistan for instance, JTACs created tactical, operational and strategic effects during the initial stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM when they used [GLOs] provide AF aircrews detailed insight into the tactical situation on the ground and detailed understanding of the ground commander's intent and his scheme of maneuver. The provision of a GLO is clearly a drain on U.S. Army personnel resources; however our observation is that enormous (emphasis added) dividends result from the investment. Without dedicated expertise imbedded in ground and air combat formations, the integration of joint airpower on the battlefield would simply not be as successful as it has been, and in some cases it would not be possible. However as they plan, Battalion leadership must simultaneously ask whether targeting the HVI will help to achieve or diminish U.S. objectives at the tactical, Recognizing the challenges that integration of maneuver and intelligence operations pose, SOF adopted a structure in Iraq that embeds intelligence operators with ground planners. SOF was able to rapidly adopt a new structure because, as a small, well-funded operational force, they own and/or have the ability to acquire intelligence platforms, systems and personnel. SOF resources enabled forward deployment of intelligence personnel where they embedded in the Tactical Operations Center. Face-to-face, they built relationships and trust and "…collaborated and fused in a flattened environment where horizontal communication is favored over vertical." This resulted in targeting that goes "…from observation to action within minutes providing the agility that counter-network and counterinsurgency forces require." SOF's "…ability to decide and its authorities to act were flattened with no need to seek higher permissions and this made it fast enough to be effective against the enemy." 35 In many ways this new SOF structure is attractive for conventional units. For example, just as SOF do not have the time to wait for intelligence in a compressed decision-making timeline, conventional ground units in Afghanistan lack the time to send requests to the JIOC and then wait for intelligence that may or may not allow them to take action. However because conventional forces in Afghanistan operate on a much larger scale, logistically it is much more difficult to create an organization that replicates the SOF structure in Iraq. Afghanistan has limited billeting space and facilities to support a large influx of intelligence operators at FOBs. Additionally, the majority of life support material such as food, water and toiletries, has to flow into Afghanistan via truck convoy through Pakistan. This limited-capacity and relatively dangerous method of resupply argues for minimizing forward footprints. SOF's new structure coupled with innovative TTPs built habitual relationships, trust and unity of effort, creating an environment where intelligence operators and SOF operators worked as a team. This new structure allows SOF to rapidly act on perishable intelligence because flat hierarchies allow seamless integration of operations to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives.
The Air Force designs its ISR weapons system to work via reach-back both to minimize forward footprints and associated logistical requirements, and to build flexibility into the weapons system. This structure allows Air Force ISR operators to simultaneously work multiple target sets in multiple Combatant Commands if required.
While Air Force leaders clearly see the benefit in this structure, many in the Army do not. Similar to their SOF counterparts, Army operators want the confidence that owning capabilities provides, which is why Army leadership pursues acquisition of ISR assets and PED capabilities to deploy with ground units. 36 This philosophical difference about ISR asset allocation and employment underpins the lack of confidence some Soldiers have in Air Force responsiveness.
While these acquisitions provide
Army units with organic ISR capability, they significantly increase logistical and force protection requirements at deployed locations, and limit availability of assets to support emerging higher priorities. However, limited manpower means that the services will not be able to embed LNOs in every unit that could use one. In an ideal world, the Army and Air Force would embed three or more Airmen or Soldiers at key locations to provide full-time coverage.
Resource realities, however, likely dictate embedding one knowledgeable Soldier or Airman at each key location. These LNOs must focus on providing expertise during operations planning and execution. Additionally, commanders must creatively schedule LNOs to allow LNOs to share their expertise across the broadest spectrum of the unit. In order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries-or, better yet, get inside [our] adversary's ObservationOrientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop. Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) [and] thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries-since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against. 38 In low-intensity conflict and especially in a counterinsurgency, the requirements for relevant information and a faster OODA loop are likely even stronger imperatives than in a Major Theater War because U.S. forces must be "…ready to take advantage of fleeting opportunities that are so often found on the insurgent battlefield." 39 [E]mpowerment of subordinate tactical commanders enable synergy and harmony of operations at a much faster "speed of war" in which we make decisions and execute faster than the enemy. "Speed of War" [refers] to the rapid decision-making and execution necessary to operate within an adversary's decision cycle (or OODA loop). This is particularly relevant in irregular warfare where the adversary may plan at low levels and act without detailed coordination.
Embedding Joint expertise at levels lower than current policy dictates and doctrine recommends, such as at echelons below Corps and Numbered Air Force (NAF), enables U.S. units to increase the relevance and speed of intelligence delivered to ground units. Increasing relevance and speed builds better situational awareness, which allows commanders to make more-informed decisions more quickly. 40 Improving the relevance and increasing the speed of intelligence delivered to ground forces allows ground forces to get inside of insurgent decision cycles to sow confusion and discord, and force insurgents to make mistakes which ground forces can exploit to create a virtuous cycle of Coalition success. [t]heater-capable [Unmanned Aerial Systems] UAS [and the processing, exploitation and dissemination that go with them] ought to be prioritized by the joint force commander to meet campaign objectives. Local-capableline-of-sight -UAS ought to be prioritized by the unit commander. There are a lot of people who misinterpret this as an Army-vs.-Air Force argument. It's not. There are no Air Force targets in Iraq or Afghanistan. The targets belong to the joint force commander. So the issue is between the perspective of the overall joint force commander and a local unit commander. To optimize UAS capability for all, the theater-capable UAVs should be flown in line with what the joint commander needs, while also ensuring there are enough local-capable UAS assets to meet smaller unit commanders' needs. It's very important that we follow our tried-and-true joint organizational approaches that have existed since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. We could be doing it better. 42 Obviously ground commanders prefer organic ISR assets that they control to provide complete ISR for every operation. 43 We have had the luxury over the last 15 or 20 years, to be blunt, of kicking the can down the road when it comes to making hard fiscal choices. The time is here when we can no longer do that [due to coming increases in Social Security and Medicare as well as the fiscal pressures of the current economic crisis]. So it makes a lot of sense for the services to get together and focus on interdependency and investing in what each does very well. We should focus investment on each service's core functions instead of trying to seek self-sufficiency.
Unfortunately with the current constraints on the U.S. budget, the Nation cannot afford multiple theater-capable ISR systems with different logistical and maintenance requirements and different PED and communications systems. As Lieutenant General Deptula points out: 44 This need to balance effectiveness with budgetary efficiency drives the requirement for changes to policy, doctrine and organizations to make the best use of the assets available. Army leaders need to commit to integrating Air Force ISR into their operations through reciprocally embedding LNOs. Senior leaders in both services must cooperate to solve challenges vice looking for significant funding to procure disparate ISR capabilities. Leaders in all services must continue to focus on initiatives that will increase the relevance of intelligence provided to all users and flatten hierarchies in order to increase situational awareness and speed decision-making to effectively counter decentralized, agile enemies. Changing doctrine and policy will encourage and ultimately direct Soldiers and Airmen to focus on integrating and creating unity of effort to meet the challenges of Afghanistan and other overseas contingency operations. Leaders can meet Secretary Gates' challenge to "do more" by incorporating new policies that maximize the capabilities of new technologies and systems. By doing so, leaders will "…meet the needs of men and women fighting in the current conflicts." The men and women risking their lives deserve no less.
